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John Courtney Murray, the Jesuit theologian, shrewdly observed that disagreement is a dif-ficult thing to reach.* Perhaps the biggest chal-
lenge in a democracy such as ours – a democracy 
composed of people with many different religious 
and cultural backgrounds and ethical outlooks – 
is how to reach disagreement.  Some of the most 
challenging and controversial issues we face often 
turn on differences among us about fundamental 
values, differences that characterize a pluralistic 
society.  Consider, for example, the continuing 
debate about abortion in the United States. For 
some, fetuses are human beings and abortion is 
always wrong because it intentionally ends the 
life of a human being.  For others, the risk or 
consequences of continuing a pregnancy might 
sometimes be sufficiently serious that an abortion 
should be permitted under these circumstances.  
For still others, moral decisions are essentially 
private matters and women should be allowed to 
decide for themselves what to do when faced with 
an unwanted pregnancy. Public opinion has been 
roughly evenly divided about whether abortions 
should be illegal, legally allowed under some 
circumstances, or left to individual decision, and 
the division of opinion has remained relatively the 
same for many years.  The differences among these 
positions run to the deepest level of our moral 
outlooks about the sanctity of life, the moral sig-
nificance of risks to health, and women’s right to 
make choices about their own reproduction.  Life, 
risk, and choice are not unreasonable fundamental 
concerns.  Disagreement at such a fundamental 
level is likely to persist; yet despite the persistence 
of moral disagreement, we must arrive at laws and 
policies that govern us all.  
   There are many other issues we face that share 
the challenge of arriving at policy decisions in 
the face of persistent moral disagreement about 
fundamental values.  Should there be a ban on hu-
man embryonic stem cell research or should it be 
permitted and even supported with federal funds?  
Should everyone have reasonable access to basic 
health care?  Should same-sex couples be allowed 
to marry? Should we intervene in the Darfur re-
gion of Sudan to protect civilians from the Janja-
weed?  We are deeply divided about each of these 
issues and our disagreement can often be traced to 
the different values that we believe are most im-
portantly at stake.  Are the therapeutic benefits de-
rived from stem cell research more important than 
the value of a human embryo?  Is health care a 
basic right or a market commodity?  Is homosexu-
ality immoral or not? Or is marriage most impor-
tantly about gender or about commitment?  Is the 
conflict in Darfur a civil war or genocide?  And if 
it is genocide, do we have a responsibility to pre-
vent genocide in another country?  It is possible 
for reasonable people to arrive at different answers 
to many of these questions because they disagree 
about fundamental values.  In a democracy char-
acterized by a diversity of cultural, religious, and 
ethical backgrounds and perspectives, how should 
we deal with the moral differences that are often 
at the root of our policy disagreements?
Unfortunately what we too often experience is 
discouragingly unhelpful: people shouting at one 
another from across the room or picket line, poli-
ticians vilifying those who disagree, commentators 
who polarize rather than illuminate issues, news 
media that gravitate to the heat of the controversy 
like moths to the flame.  Intolerance, divisiveness, 
and hostility have come to dominate the public 
square.  
   Given the incivility of many of our disagree-
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disengage, becoming indifferent to the issues and 
uninterested in the political and policy debates 
about them.  But indifference is as unhelpful as 
intolerance because these issues are important, as 
important as they are divisive.  They deserve our 
considered attention and our democracy deserves 
better than the spectacle that too often passes for 
deliberation about our most complex and con-
troversial disagreements.  So how might we do 
better?
   Perhaps one place to begin is by thinking about 
disagreement itself, its place in democratic culture, 
and what it requires of us.  
   There are, of course, different kinds of disagree-
ment.  You think the tower is 100 feet high and 
I think it’s 120 feet.  There is a fact of the matter 
here and the disagreement is settled by measuring.  
But the disagreements that divide us are not like 
this.
   Some argue that what’s happening in Darfur 
is genocide and that the U.S. should intervene.  
Others argue that it is civil war that should be 
left to Sudan to work through.  What kind of 
disagreement is this?  It is not so much a disagree-
ment about facts as about definitions.  There is a 
United Nations Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that 
defines what a genocide is and the disagreement 
is about whether the violence in Darfur meets 
the criteria agreed to in the convention or not.  
It matters what we call it since international law 
allows intervention by another country to prevent 
genocide but not civil war. 
   I believe that Creation Science is a scientific 
theory that should be taught alongside Evolution-
ary Theory in biology classes.  You think Creation 
Science is religion and has no place in a biology 
classroom.  This disagreement is somewhat like 
the Darfur case in that it is in part about what we 
mean by scientific theory, but genocide – at least 
for now – is a relatively settled concept in inter-
national law, and what theory is and what con-
stitutes a scientific theory are relatively less well 
settled, though there is a substantial body of tradi-
tion and scholarship to draw from to formulate 
criteria.  But this is a disagreement about religion 
in relation to science, a disagreement that dates 
back to the earliest years of the Christian era.
A final example: I believe that an embryonic stem 
cell is a human being but you don’t. What kind 
of disagreement is this?  It is not really a factual 
disagreement like the height of the tower, since it 
is not about the biology of stem cells but about 
whether they have the right to life that human 
beings have.  And there are no international agree-
ments that specify what it is to be a human being.  
What there is are different religious and ethical 
traditions, some which believe that the right to life 
begins at conception and others that believe differ-
ently, including some outlooks that would deny 
that there is any right to life at all. 
   What is expected of reasonable people whose 
disagreements arise primarily from differences 
about values, especially when decisions must 
be made about laws and policies that affect us 
all?  How might we do a better job of deliberat-
ing about differences in values than we currently 
experience in politics, the media, and the public 
square?
   We might begin by accepting that disagreement 
is not necessarily a bad thing and that healthy dis-
agreement is important for a healthy democracy.  
John Stuart Mill recognized that a free society is 
best served by maximum liberty of thought and 
discussion and that giving fair hearing even to re-
pugnant opinions serves liberty. Tolerance requires 
that we accept that those who disagree with us are 
not stupid, villainous, unpatriotic, or fools.  They 
may have good reasons for their views and we 
must be open to those reasons and be prepared 
to give reasons for our own.  “To refuse a hearing 
to an opinion because they are sure that it is false 
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is to assume that their certainty is the same thing 
as absolute certainty.  All silencing of discussion 
is an assumption of infallibility.”**  Diversity of 
opinion and reasoned disagreement allow us to 
exchange error for truth or arrive at a more con-
sidered judgment when we can, but as important, 
to agree to disagree when we must.  We may never 
resolve some fundamental moral disagreements, 
but we still must find ways to seek common 
ground, to deal with such reality as dangerous 
pregnancies, debilitating diseases, unfairness, and 
catastrophes of war, even when we disagree.  
–
9
** John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Hackett 
Publishing Co, 1978, p. 17.  Originally 
published in 1859.
